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THE COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
PROCESS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR TIMID
LOCAL GOVERNMENT?
FRANK J. MACCHIAROLA*
High school civics lessons taught us that the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branches form the basis of our system of govern-
ment. Educators taught us that "separation of powers" meant
that each branch had its own responsibilities to adhere to under
the Constitution. The separation of powers doctrine provides that
each branch does not usually interfere with its counterparts. The
judicial branch, in particular, must avoid "political questions" and
leave the administration of the law to the executive and legislative
branches.'
However, reality is not this simple. Despite our civics lessons
and our constitutional framework, the line separating the
branches of government has become blurred, resulting in a serious
erosion of the separation of powers doctrine. In many cases, sepa-
ration between the branches seems to have disappeared entirely.
For example, administrative agencies, the "headless fourth
branch" of government, govern outside the standard three branch
paradigm.
This article addresses a related phenomenon: the deliberate ab-
dication of power by the political branches on difficult questions by
forwarding matters to the judiciary for resolution. Specifically, I
will examine the significantly increased role of an old device: the
consent decree, a mechanism which allows parties in dispute to
engage the court to administer and enforce settlement agree-
ments. These decrees have been used by parties to settle disputes
* LL.B., 1965, Ph.D., 1970, Columbia University. The author is Dean and Professor of
Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University and Professor of Polit-
ical Science at Yeshiva University.
Research assistance was provided by Cardozo students and alumni Susan Simon, Pam
McLaughlin, Michael Miller, Ayall Shanzer, Tim Katsoulis, Daniel Feder, Hugh Zanger,
and Nikiforos Mathews under a grant from the Manhattan Institute. I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Eric Lane, Edward Costikyan, and Joseph Diaz for their help.
1 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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with the government regarding governmental administration. By
empowering the courts to supervise and dictate governmental pol-
icy and operation, consent decrees have distorted the structure of
government. Often, such extensive transfers of legislative and ex-
ecutive power to the courts represent a fundamental failure of
these political branches to fulfill their responsibilities.
I. THE RISE OF NEW BRANCH POLrrIcs: PASSING THE BUCK
Beginning in the 1970's, a litigation explosion led to the expan-
sion of rights that the judicial branch felt obligated to protect.
These rights took on a life of their own2 and courts fashioned new
remedies and created new arrangements to settle grievances. If
the political structure hesitated in responding to a grievance, the
courts were only too eager to do so. In that age of judicial activ-
ism, political officials developed a "cover your backside" approach
to politics.
The executive and legislative branches took the judiciary's invi-
tation to use-and often abuse-the courts to solve their tough
problems. This "politics of avoidance" allowed the executive and
legislative branches to shirk their duties. While their words were
bold, their deeds were timid, and their grand rhetoric created bar-
ren results. Whatever the issue-from discrimination to reappor-
tionment of Congressional districts-the political actors were
pleased to have the courts take up the matter and take the heat,
which was traditionally part and parcel of the job in the political
branches.
In many areas, New York City's (the "City") and New York
State's (the "State") legislative and executive branches trans-
formed their duties from determining and enforcing the law and
Constitution to the task of framing questions for the courts to an-
swer. They no longer decided many legal or constitutional issues
for themselves. Instead, they referred them to the courts. Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo provides a telling, but by no means singular,
example. Upon entering office, Governor Cuomo took the follow-
ing customary oath of office:
2 See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION passim (1991); Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
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I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the
United States, and the constitution of the State of New York,
and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of
Governor according to the best of my ability.3
However, in stark contrast to this oath, upon signing legislation
creating state legislative districts, the Governor declared:
It seems clear to me-and I believe it will be clear as well to
other objective reviewers-that the Republican plan had as
its primary concern the protection of incumbents against any
real challenge. In doing so, I believe the Justice Department
and the courts will both conclude that laws have been vio-
lated, despite the presumption of validity.4
This statement, along with his signing of the bill, clearly ex-
presses the Governor's preference for the judiciary to decide legal
issues for him.
A. The Litigation Explosion
The litigation explosion dramatically increased the judiciary's
intrusion into what were traditionally political questions. The ef-
fect of this power shift has been a change in the way the State and
City governments operate. While the effect on the roles of these
political branches of government and the process of governing has
been the most obvious, the substantive outcomes of significant
public policy controversies have also been changed. In effect,
while the legislature and the executive have spent more time on
the process of government, they have had less of an impact on the
results.
This outcome manifested itself in significant ways for the City
and State of New York. Litigation, rather than legislation, deter-
mined significant policy changes such as whether construction of
the federally funded Westway highway in Manhattan would be
undertaken. As deadlines for the start of the project passed and
litigation continued into the 1980's, much time and public expense
3 N.Y. CONST. art. 13, § 1.
4 Governor's Memorandum on Creation of New Legislative Districts, reprinted in [1992]
N.Y. Laws 2874-76 (McKinney). The Governor's statement was made during the signing of
legislation creating new legislative districts for the New York State Senate and Assembly.
Id.; see also Kevin Sack, In One Big Sweep, Albany Backs New Voting Laws and Districting,
N.Y. TnwMs, May 5, 1992, at Al.
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were wasted in the courts. The final result, as determined by the
court, was the defeat of the Westway highway.'
More recently, when the State Consumer Protection Board ob-
jected to the Public Service Commission's grant of an electricity
rate increase for Consolidated Edison, these State agencies liti-
gated the matter in the State court. 6 In the end, three State agen-
cies settled an issue uniquely suited for determination by one
agency. Another example occurred when the legislature would not
draw new congressional district lines under reapportionment in
1992. Two court plans were required to break the legislative log
jam.7 This demonstrated the legislature's abdication of a signifi-
cant role to the judiciary.
B. The Expansive Role of the Judiciary
1. The Daily Management of New York City Jails
It is now clear to any student of state and local government that
the courts are the locus where various disputes are settled be-
cause the political process has ceded its authority. New York pro-
vides abundant examples of this unfortunate situation. There has
been so much judicial supervision in the daily management of
New York City jails that one senior City official asserted that
Judge Morris Lasker of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has been the actual Commissioner
of Corrections for over fifteen years. In the face of what seems to
be administrative incompetence, as well as a failure to observe ba-
sic standards of prisoner rights, Judge Lasker has had constant
involvement through the implementation of the consent decree
originally agreed to by the City in 1977.8 His orders, pursuant to
this decree, deal with the maximum population of the jails, the
minimum space permitted for each prisoner, the extent of tele-
5 See Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 481 F. Supp. 397 passim
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Sierra Club v. Hennessey, 695 F.2d 643, 644 (2d Cir. 1982); Action
for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
6 See New York Consumer Protection Bd. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 85 A.D.2d
321, 323, 449 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (3d Dep't 1982).
7 See Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Educ. Fund v. Gantt, 796 F. Supp. 681 passim
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Reid v. Marino, No. 92-9567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County June 8, 1992).
8 See Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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phone service and laundry facilities, and the quality of food,9
among other items.
In New York City, the consent decree apparatus is so extensive
and expansive that the courts often function as a counterbalance
to the democratic process of electoral politics. Despite the wisdom
of their decisions, the fact remains that judicial decisions are
made because the traditional political process has failed. The
New York City Council and Mayor are required to consider the
financial obligations of the city in significant areas of government
because the courts have defined basic municipal obligations.
Whether it is the environment, housing discrimination, education,
homelessness, treatment of the mentally ill, or prisoners' rights,
the judicial role in the recent past has been enormously enhanced
as the political branches of government have ceded their responsi-
bilities to "higher authority." Such a situation places certain mu-
nicipal and state duties above other duties because of legal entitle-
ments that have been defined through the device of consent
decrees. The result is the erosion of government autonomy in the
face of a new type of entitlement. Decisions are taken away from
those to whom power is appropriately vested. The situation per-
petuates the lack of confidence in government and, therefore, the
governmental process falters.
2. The Lack of State and Local Autonomy
Consent decrees have become the most formidable mechanism
for the recent enhancement of judicial power at the expense of lo-
cal and state autonomy. Although the consent decree has been
employed since 1859,10 its use emerged in the 1930's and in-
creased substantially in the 1970's. Initially, judges used consent
decrees to combat the cost and inflexibility of court judgments.
Their suitability to more agreeable remedies made them useful for
antitrust litigation in particular." Today, the use of consent de-
9 See generally Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 passim (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (examining
constitutionality of conditions of confinement); Rhem v. Malcolm, 396 F. Supp. 1195 passim
(S.D.N.Y.) (same), affd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d. Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964
passim (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 passim (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(enjoining defendants from confining anyone after specified date because of refusal to cure
conditions).
10 See United States v. Peralta, 27 F. Cas. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1859). This was the earliest
decision using a consent decree.
11 Since before the turn of the century, consent decrees were used in a wide variety of
circumstances and often the underlying case was complicated. See, e.g., McGowan v. Par-
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crees has expanded considerably. They are commonly employed to
effectuate institutional and criminal justice reform; resolve envi-
ronmental disputes; and resolve disputes involving school, hous-
ing, and employment discrimination.
Consent decrees are actually settlement contracts, containing
injunctive relief, formulated and implemented under the supervi-
sion of the trial court. In contrast to private settlements, which
remain under the exclusive control of the parties to the agree-
ment, a trial court maintains continued jurisdiction over a consent
decree. This places the court in the role of watchdog and media-
tor. In effect, the consent decree embodies an admission by the
parties that the settlement reached is a just determination of their
rights, made under the sanction of the court. It is useful when the
required remedy will take time to implement. The typical consent
decree will include a statement of facts and goals, a statement of
obligations and deadlines, reporting requirements, exchange of in-
formation agreements, monitoring procedures, and extrajudicial
enforcement mechanisms such as review panels.
II. THE CONSENT DECREE IN ACTION: EXAMPLES OF FAILURE
Consent decrees contain elements of contract and judicial ac-
tion. Two events are necessary to create a consent decree. First,
settling parties must submit a proposed agreement to the court.
Next, the court endorses the parties' agreement, thereby render-
ing it a true hybrid of contract and judicial act. While this may
sound straightforward, consent decrees present the courts with
several problems, including: whether the court should approve the
consent decree, whether the decree is a fair and effective means of
settling a dispute, whether the parties are meeting their obliga-
tions under the decree, and the attendant problem of permitting
decree modification in the event the agreement is ineffective.
ish, 237 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1915) (consent decree concerning legal fees, in case involving
claim for ice service provided to government in 1863); Nashville C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
United States, 113 U.S. 261, 262-65 (1884) (consent decree entered into for bill for mail
services rendered before Civil War); Garrett & Co. v. Sweet Valley Wine Co., 251 F. 371,
374 (N.D. Ohio 1918) (consent decree used in trademark dispute). Consent decrees were
also relied upon by the government in their prosecution of antitrust cases. See William J.
Donovan & Breck P. McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust
Laws, 46 HARv. L. REv. 885, 887, 911-12 (1933); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 108-11 (1932); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 320 (1928).
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The consent decree forces the court to assume an unfamiliar
role. The judge must remain involved enough to discharge the
parties' obligations while remaining detached enough to allow
others to discharge their duties. In such a situation, the courts
become politically vulnerable. Faced with standards of judicial
behavior that limit their ability to comment on their own cases,
judges are inherently limited in their ability to defend their deci-
sions. Moreover, to the extent that the courts are drawn into con-
troversies, judges are forced to expend political capital because of
the media coverage and public debate surrounding many consent
decrees.
Over time, courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have struggled with how to define the appropriate judicial role
when a consent decree is made. During the period of judicial ac-
tivism encouraged by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren's tenure, courts saw their roles expand and they accepted
broader responsibilities. More recently, however, the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist has acknowledged
the adverse effects of judicial activism. One area of this recogni-
tion has concerned consent decrees.
A. The Supreme Court's Use of Consent Decrees
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held, in Rufo v. In-
mates of Suffolk County Jail,'2 that greater authority should be
given to the court to modify a consent decree where it has an im-
pact upon local government. 13 Justice Byron White reasoned that
the increase in the number and duration of consent decrees re-
quired a more flexible approach to reform.' 4 Particularly impor-
tant, the Court noted, was the public's interest in the sound and
efficient operation of its governmental institutions. The Court ex-
plained that efficient government is subverted by an intrusive role
for courts. 15 The upshot of Rufo is that the Supreme Court should
look more favorably upon local governments which seek to reform
consent decrees on the basis of local government need.
The Rufo decision also illustrated the danger accompanying the
binding nature of consent decrees on the political process. In par-
12 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
13 Id. at 758.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 759.
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ticular, the Court reasoned that one city administration should
not necessarily be tied by actions of a preceding administration.
The general notion of citizens being able to alter governmental
policies by voting in new administrations is significantly sub-
verted by judicial consent decrees which may carry on for years
without formal adjudication. Indeed, in New York City, New York
Supreme Court Justice Helen E. Freedman threatened to person-
ally punish members of the Dinkins administration, including
First Deputy Mayor Norman Steisel, for not complying with
agreements made by the prior administration. 16 In Rufo, the
Supreme Court allowed a challenge to the policies of a predecessor
administration by providing the current administration an oppor-
tunity to prove a change of circumstances and facts.' 7 Such an in-
vitation allows the executive and legislative branches of local gov-
ernment to meet their legal responsibilities. The Supreme Court
decision offers some reassurance in light of the significant
problems that have occurred with consent decrees. It is reassur-
ing, however, only if elected officials are willing to deal with the
issues that have been given over to the courts.
B. Failed Uses of Consent Decrees in New York City
In New York City, legislators and executives continue to circum-
vent their responsibilities. Thus, the consent decree increasingly
becomes the basis for municipal government policy. Such abdica-
tion by political actors carries severe financial implications for
New York City's taxpayers. In terms of local tax dollars, the most
costly consent decrees appear to involve environmental issues.
While federal environmental regulation has been extensive, regu-
lators and advocates have relied heavily on the courts to imple-
ment certain standards.
1. The Sewage Treatment Debate
In the area of sewage treatment, the consent decree became the
vehicle for implementing federal pure water standards with
which, by the City's admission, it had failed to comply. A North
River Sewage Treatment Plant was first proposed in 1941. It was
16 Celia W. Dugger, Four Dinkins Officials Found in Contempt on Housing Delay, N.Y.
TimES, Nov. 21, 1992, at Al.
17 Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 760.
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to treat more than 170 million gallons of raw sewage that the City
was dumping into the Hudson River. Remarkably, the plan was
left virtually unattended until a consent decree was entered into
in 1977, and then modified in 1979.18 The consent decree estab-
lished a timetable for the completion of the sewage treatment fa-
cility by 1987. The same delay in the City's schedule occurred in
Red Hook, Brooklyn, where the construction of a similar facility
was delayed for over ten years.19
2. Ocean Dumping of Solid Waste
The sewage treatment decrees are complemented by consent de-
crees governing ocean dumping of solid waste. On December 7,
1987, New York City signed a consent decree with Woodbridge
Township, New Jersey, to prevent garbage generated in New York
City from polluting the New Jersey shoreline. 20 The decree pro-
vided for harsh penalties if the City failed to meet timetables for
installing pollution control equipment in New York City Harbor
waste transfer and disposal facilities. The City was also subject to
a fine of one million dollars and additional penalty payments to
cover the cost of cleaning up the Woodbridge waterfront area. In
addition, the decree called for the appointment of a special master
to supervise the construction of the landfill at Fresh Kill and the
creation of a twenty-four hour water monitoring team.
While the consent decree addressed environmental concerns,
and perhaps implemented the relevant laws, this "environmental
policy" was created by a court and not the environmental agencies
affected. Once again, a consent decree was used to avoid political
costs and detracted from the effectiveness of the executive branch.
Although the ocean dumping issue has not generated headlines, it
is only a matter of time before the issue re-emerges, for the City is
currently permitted to dump in violation of federal standards only
because it has negotiated by consent decree to continue this dump-
ing through 1998. Moreover, the City's solid waste disposal pro-
gram calls for an end to dumping at the City's last landfill in
Staten Island. The inability of the City Council and the hesitancy
of the mayor's office to provide for incinerator plants or reasonable
18 United States v. New York City, No. 77 Civ. 76 (S.D.N.Y. filed January 7, 1977).
19 United States v. New York City, No. 77 Civ. 2290 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 11, 1977).
20 United States v. New York City, No. CV-89-2571 (E.D.N.Y. filed August 4, 1989).
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alternatives to deal with solid waste leaves the prospect of judicial
intervention a near certainty. As the deadlines draw near, the
City's approach may ultimately be not the construction of ade-
quate and appropriate solid waste facilities, but the further exten-
sion of its failure to comply with federal standards.
3. Housing Discrimination
The process of governance by consent decree is not a simple one,
and is made even more complex when there are private parties
who have adverse and competing interests. The City's handling of
housing discrimination in the public housing facilities of Williams-
burg, Brooklyn is a case in point. In this section of Brooklyn, the
Satmar Hasidic Jews, Latinos, and African-Americans compete
for limited public housing. The Latino and African-American com-
munities believe that the Satmar have achieved great success in
securing housing in these projects at their expense. Frustrated by
the unresponsiveness of the New York City Housing Authority,
advocates representing each of these groups turned to the courts.
In 1976, a class action suit was filed by Brooklyn Legal Services
and the Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee, two public inter-
est groups concerned with fair housing issues.2 The suit alleged
that racial quotas were used to determine the occupancy of apart-
ments in public housing projects and privately owned federally
subsidized housing developments.2 2 Judge Charles H. Tenney of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that the management of these 3,000 apartments vio-
lated the Fair Housing Act of 1968.23
Within two years, relief was granted in the form of a consent
decree to which all the parties agreed, with the exception of one
defendant. 4 The overall plan described in the consent decree was
unambiguous. Quotas were to be abandoned and, as a remedial
measure, an affirmative rental plan was put into effect until mi-
21 See Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
22 Id. at 603. Defendants in the suit were the New York City Housing Authority, the
United States Department of Housing ("HUD"), two private management companies
(Kraus Management, Inc. and Ross-Rodney Housing Corp.), and the United Jewish Organi-
zations of Williamsburg ("UJO") as an intervenor-defendant. Id. at 603. UJO alleged that
the use of the quota system had denied apartments to white applicants. Id. at 603.
23 Id. at 606; see also Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
24 Williamsburg, 450 F. Supp. at 603. The only defendant who refused to sign the con-
sent decree was Kraus Management, Inc. ("Kraus"). Id.
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nority tenants occupied fifty percent of the apartments in each de-
velopment. An eighteen month adjustment period was created to
assure that minority representation in the apartments be brought
up to thirty-two percent. Rentals of vacated apartments to minor-
ities were .to be increased to fifty percent until the goals of the
consent decree were reached. Additionally, the United Jewish Or-
ganizations of Williamsburg agreed to make efforts to persuade at
least twenty white families to vacate their units and move to Ro-
berto Clemente Plaza, a predominantly Latino and African-Ameri-
can housing complex.
Compliance with the decree was also expressly specified. The
consent decree provided that objective, nonracial and reviewable
rental standards and procedures were to be prepared by the man-
agement companies and approved by a committee made up of rep-
resentatives for the plaintiffs, the government agencies that were
parties in the suit and the United States Department of Justice.
Detailed monthly compliance reports including the status of
rental units in each development and a description of each waiting
list including information on race, national origin, and priority
were to be forwarded to committee members.
Any complaints about the defendants' rental choices were to be
directed to the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") or
the New York City Housing and Development Administration for
investigation. The findings of these investigations were to be re-
ported in writing to the review committee. The federal courts re-
tained jurisdiction and Judge Tenney reserved the authority to
modify or add to his decree. Despite the consent decree, in 1989
Brooklyn Legal Services and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund filed a contempt motion, charging that the
NYCHA violated the 1978 court order by failing to integrate the
housing projects as required by the agreement.25 The parties
agreed to a new decree in 1991. Once again a consent decree for-
bade the use of quotas but, instead of relying on percentage agree-
ments, it called for the next 190 vacancies in three public develop-
ments, the Taylor-Wythe Houses, Jonathan Williams Plaza and
Independence Towers, to be filled by minority residents. They
were to be selected from a list of people interviewed for public
25 Contempt Mot., Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450
F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (76 Civ. 2125).
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housing between 1980 and 1988, which is when the discrimination
occurred.26
This remedy was necessary because the executive branch and
legislature failed to address the issue and the judiciary considered
the inaction as an invitation to intervene. The fiscal impact asso-
ciated with this thirteen year controversy, in terms of attorney's
fees and court costs borne by the government, could have funded
the construction of many new units.
In 1992, New York City admitted that it engaged in citywide
discrimination when assigning tenants to public housing. The de-
lays in obtaining this admission are indications of the reluctance
of political officials to undertake their own assessment of the legal
or constitutional issues they face. In effect, notwithstanding fed-
eral findings as far back as 1983 and state findings as far back as
1986, the City continued a systematic pattern of racial steering of
applicants for public housing. The City's administration did not
recognize its constitutional and legal duties until it was mandated
by the court to recognize them.
Proponents of consent decrees argue that government reform in
similar cases will not occur if left in the hands of the legislature or
recalcitrant bureaucrats. Perhaps this is true. However, when
litigation costs often exceed the costs of plaintiff's original needs,
it is time to examine other .means for insuring protection of New
York's under-represented interest groups. This could possibly in-
clude means that might result in personal liability for public
officials.
4. Bilingual Education
There are other ways in which the remedy fashioned by the
courts is unsatisfactory. While the courts may adequately carry
out their traditional judicial functions, they are not able to hear
evidence on policy, as may the legislature. Furthermore, courts
are constrained by legal rules. Nowhere is this more clear than in
issues concerning education. In the area of bilingual education,
the New York City public school system has struggled with con-
sent decree activity that has distorted the basic purpose of provid-
ing an appropriate and effective education for students whose sec-
28 ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 79-CV-270 (S.D.N.Y. filed
April 17, 1991).
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ond language is English. The basis for legal action was the
Bilingual Education Act of 1968,27 the first federal legislation to
focus exclusively on non-English speaking children.
The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, on behalf
of ASPIRA, a private advocacy group working on behalf of the His-
panic community, brought a class action suit against the New
York City Board of Education in the name of the Spanish-speak-
ing school children who were deprived of their right to equal edu-
cational opportunities. 28 A consent decree was entered and filed
on August 29, 1974 by Judge Marvin E. Frankel of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.29 The
decree stated that by September of 1975, the Board was to provide
"a planned and systematic program designed to develop the pu-
pil's ability to speak, understand, read and write in the English
language."30 The decree affected all Spanish-speaking and Span-
ish-surnamed New York City public school pupils whose English
language deficiency prevented them from effectively participating
in the learning process.
In retrospect, it is clear that the plan was likely to be unattaina-
ble within the time frame specified. As a result, the City's school
system was continually placed on the defensive for failing to meet
the plan's deadlines.3 ' Additionally, the implementation of the
program suffered since an overwhelming number of educators be-
lieved that the program called for in the decree actually defeated
the very purpose of the educational system. Educators viewed the
program as grounded in politics rather than in education. While
there are exceptions to this in a few bilingual efforts, the case il-
lustrates a basic problem with the judiciary setting a program in
motion. Decisions are taken away from those usually responsible
for them, leaving the judiciary wedded to the implementation of
the plan, even when the plan increasingly appears questionable.
27 Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 701-6, 81 Stat. 816 (1968).
28 ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., (72 Civ. 4002) (S.D.N.Y.
filed August 29, 1974).
29 Id.
30 ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 394 F. Supp. 1161, 1162
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
31 The plaintiffs went before Judge Frankel on several occasions seeking contempt or-
ders against the Board of Education for its alleged failure to adhere to the deadlines con-
tained in the original consent decree. See, e.g., ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City
Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City
Bd. of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); ASPIRA of New York, Inc. v. New York City
Bd. of Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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This allows the decree to take on a life of its own, often proceeding
in a policy direction which moves away, rather than toward, the
goal the consent decree is designed to meet.
The ASPIRA decree also invited the classroom to be the focus of
political contention. The professionals ceased thinking about the
students' welfare. Instead, they felt that the issue was removed
from their sphere of concern. Finally, when pressed about who
would teach in this program, the school system admitted it was
unable to supply enough professionals capable of delivering the
services under the terms of the consent decree. Again, entering
into decrees without sufficient resources to comply with even their
short-term requirements hardly appears a reasonable way to re-
solve a problem.
The fundamental wrong with such intrusions into the public
schools is that they form the basis for school officials to excuse
their obligation to school children. The movement toward effec-
tive education flies directly in the face of federal law and regula-
tion in bilingual education.3 2 Effective child-centered theories of
education minimize the differences among children. This logic
was the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education3 3 that "separate but equal" was inherently un-
equal.3 4 A consent decree, such as this one, is educationally harm-
ful because it justifies isolating youngsters from the mainstream
and excusing the bureaucracy from providing children with a
sound education. In essence, even if the consent decree could be
complied with, it would not result in an improvement in
education.
5. The Homeless Debate
Still another area where consent decrees have resulted in rule
by the judiciary involves the homeless. The right of the homeless
to private shelters has been judicially fashioned and has devel-
oped into a legal entitlement, although not a constitutional one.
In Callahan v. Carey,35 six homeless men on behalf of themselves
and those similarly situated, challenged the sufficiency and qual-
32 It should not be forgotten that effective education must also be provided to handi-
capped children.
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34 Id. at 495.
35 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
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ity of homeless shelters in New York City. 6 The plaintiffs brought
the suit against the Governor of New York State, Mayor of New
York City, and other state and local officials.
On August 26, 1981, the parties agreed to a consent decree to
settle the following issues: providing shelters for homeless men;
the standards and qualities of those shelters; intake centers; com-
munity participation on sheltering homeless men; information dis-
semination; and the monitoring of City compliance with the con-
sent decree. 7 In part, the decree required New York City to
provide clean and safe accommodations to every homeless man
who sought shelter. The agreement did not force the City to open
community shelters as originally sought by the plaintiffs. Under
the agreement, each shelter must provide clean towels and linens
weekly, lockable storage units, showers and pay telephones, over-
night security guards at identified facilities, and recreational ac-
tivities. The City was also ordered to open an armory or other new
facility for homeless men by October 21, 1981.
This decree led to many repeated trips before the New York
State Supreme Court for both sides. 38 Homeless advocates
claimed that the City did not comply with the original decree.
Similarly, the City sought to have the original decree modified due
to the recession and budget constraints. The City also claimed
that the decree actually hampered its ability to provide necessary
services to the homeless.
In February of 1983, the terms of the 1981 consent decree were
applied to shelters for homeless women. Justice Arnold G.
Fraiman of the New York State Supreme Court for the County of
New York called a claim by four homeless women seeking the
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Weiser v. Koch, 632 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Canaday v. Koch,
608 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Canaday v. Koch, 598 F. Supp. 1139, 1145
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Slade v. Koch, 135 Misc. 2d 283, 290, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847,852 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1987); Lamboy v. Gross, 129 Misc. 2d 564, 571-72, 493 N.Y.S.2d 709, 714-15 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1985); Wilkins v. Perales, 128 Misc. 2d 2365, 2368, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985); McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc. 2d 20, 20, 484 N.Y.S.2d 982, 983
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985); McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc. 2d 23, 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984); New York City v. Blum, 121 Misc. 2d 982, 983-84, 470
N.Y.S.2d 308, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
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same rights granted to homeless men in 1981, "so obviously meri-
torious that it scarcely warrants discussion."3 9
As recently as 1987, a New York State Supreme Court upheld
the decree.40 An examination of the adequacy of these shelters,
however, posits the question whether court intrusion has actually
resulted in improved conditions for the homeless. The City's bu-
reaucrats are in a defensive posture, trying to catch up to man-
dates they previously agreed to meet even though it was known at
that time they would be virtually impossible to meet.41 The advo-
cate's strategy is to use the consent decree mechanism for incre-
mental improvement. While the courts continue to play a role in
the process, targets are specified and not met because they are
unattainable, because of bureaucratic resistance, or because of in-
herent unattainability.
6. Facilities for the Mentally Handicapped
Consent decrees are often virtually endless. The closing of one
facility for the mentally disabled resulted in almost two decades of
court scrutiny. In April of 1975, Governor Hugh Carey signed a
consent decree ("1975 agreement") to reduce overcrowding at the
Staten Island Willowbrook Development Center ("Willowbrook
Center").42 Under the consent decree, patients were to be placed in
group homes and other community facilities.4 3 In 1979, however,
under constituency pressure, the State legislature terminated
funding for a review panel charged with implementing the 1975
agreement because constituent groups did not want the mentally
handicapped persons or group homes in their neighborhoods.
The 1975 agreement set April 30, 1982, as the deadline for the
State to reduce the Willowbrook Center population to 250 pa-
tients. Judge John R. Bartels of the United States District Court
39 See Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 163-64, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960, 961 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983) (finding showers and toilets must be installed at two womens' shelters at
City's expense).
40 Thrower v. Perales, 138 Misc. 2d 172, 176, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983) (pointing out statutory law and legislature have not spoken on issue, but
rather court did in Callahan consent decree).
41 Indeed, part of the strategy from the government agencies' perspectives in agreeing to
consent decrees appears to be buying time. See Sutton Area Community v. New York City
Bd. of Estimates, 165 A.D.2d 456, 460, 568 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (2d Dep't 1991) (discussing
government delay in construction concerning waterway).42 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
43 Id. at 718.
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for the Eastern District of New York, ruled that the State was not
complying with the 1975 agreement." The Willowbrook Center
was placed in the hands of a special master in order to achieve
compliance with the 1975 agreement. Not until March of 1987 did
Judge Bartels finally approve a settlement for Willowbrook. The
terms of the settlement were met six years later in March of 1993.
What often makes consent decrees attractive to litigants is the
way in which the costs of these claims are met. During the 1970's,
Congress sought to encourage the policing of administrative agen-
cies by "citizen suits." Congressional statutes in the environmen-
tal and civil rights areas liberalized standing requirements,
thereby making it easier for concerned groups to sue government
and private entities. Congress also mandated that unsuccessful
defendants in such suits pay for plaintiffs' attorney fees. In the
case of consent decrees, this means that plaintiffs' attorneys can
be awarded fees for the life of the decree if the need for modifica-
tion arises. Fees generated by such suits can be considerable. For
example, in New York State Association for Retarded Children v.
Carey,45 the court awarded $613,992 to plaintiff's counsel. Thus,
added to the attorney fees for the City and State were the legal
fees necessary to represent the plaintiffs.
7. The New York City Police Department
The problems surrounding the use of consent decrees have even
affected the New York City Police Department's surveillance pro-
cedures which have been constantly monitored by the courts. In
1985, the City entered into a consent decree settling a claim that
charged the City's police with violating the civil rights of politi-
cally active groups and individuals. 46 The terms of the agreement
allowed the police to investigate the political activities of individu-
als or groups only if they had specific information that the targets
44 See generally New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp.
1165, 1177 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 727 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1984); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 544 F. Supp. 330, 343 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 711 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir.
1982); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1099, 1103
(E.D.N.Y. 1980); Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 729
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 456 F. Supp. 85, 87
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440,
442 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
45 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
46 Handschu v. Special Serv. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 787
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986).
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were engaged in, about to engage in, or threatened to engage in
criminal activity.
In July of 1989, Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
that the New York City Police Department violated the 1985 con-
sent decree which placed limits on police surveillance tech-
niques. Judge Haight explained that monitoring and taping the
views expressed on a radio station in New York City did not meet
the court approved standards.48 The court further held that the
police violated the guidelines established in 1985 when under-
cover police officers attended meetings of various politically active
49groups.
III. THE COMPROMISE FOR THE POLITICAL AND
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
Although court intervention is often necessary, one must be con-
cerned with this apparent trend because consent decrees are un-
healthy for the political system. The use of consent decrees under-
scores the failure of the executive and legislative branches of
government to meet their basic obligation to make and enforce law
and adds greatly to the cost of government. From the standpoint
of the judiciary, it perverts the very nature of the judicial process.
The consent decree process relies on the court's active participa-
tion throughout the process. Diverse parties must depend solely
on the judge to sift through a myriad of facts and considerations to
make determinations that a proposed decree is fair and workable,
that the terms ultimately have been met or that a modification is
justified. Without the benefit of a judicative process to help elimi-
nate inconsistencies, or the resources which an administrative
staff could provide, the judges who must decide some of our most
pressing social issues bear an enormous burden.
Without question, consent decrees have imposed new costs and
time pressures on our already overburdened court system. More
than time, however, is at issue. For some, consent decrees present
troubling doctrinal issues. The court is actually superseding its
role and interfering with the everyday workings of the democratic
47 Handschu v. Special Serv. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
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process. Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit was one of the first
judges to speak out against the use of the consent decrees in social
reform litigation. His dissent in Citizens for a Better Environment
v. Gorsuch5 ° argued that consent decrees freeze democratic regu-
latory processes in areas such as environmental litigation 5 1 and
replace these processes with the actions of a branch of government
not intended or equipped to accommodate the wide range of inter-
ests affected by a decree.52
Those opposed to the use of consent decrees accurately point out
that the decrees may encourage the formation of sub rosa alli-
ances between public bureaucrats and special interests. In this
scenario, agency administrators leave their budget battles to pub-
lic interest groups who bring suits and push for court-ordered de-
crees. When a decree is entered, the agency administrator has a
potent and usually highly publicized bargaining chip with which
to force increased budget allocations from the legislature.
Critics also observe that consent orders are often negotiated in
private between bureaucrats and organizations charged with vio-
lating laws, such as those involving environmental regulations.
In such cases, there is selective enforcement of breaches of law or
decree. A new private law enforcement system is created. Gov-
ernment bureaucrats in New York City often relish the benefits
that consent decrees provide their agencies. On a less theoretical
level, "government by consent decree" engenders shortsighted and
piecemeal policy making. Such a knee-jerk approach disregards
the need to balance claims of other interest groups with equally
legitimate needs. The consent decree virtually ignores the uncer-
tainties of the future by locking government into static policies of
bygone administrations.
In addition, consent decrees change the priorities of an agency's
budget and staff resources. In order to comply with a consent de-
cree affecting only one policy, agencies can be forced to reduce
services to other clients who are equally entitled to these re-
sources, or lobby the fiscally-strapped legislature for additional
funds taken either from taxpayers or appropriations earmarked
50 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
51 See id. at 1126 (stating public often is overlooked as victim of consent decree).
52 Id. at 1136 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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for other government services. Nowhere has this been more prev-
alent than in the area of education, where mandates, often de-
rived from consent decrees, result in diminished services in the
classrooms of "ordinary" and not specially protected students.
The longterm impact consent decrees have on an agency be-
comes magnified when the social problems which prompted the
decree have been underestimated or not fully anticipated by the
administrator who originally agreed to the terms of the decree.
This is illustrated in Callahan v. Carey.53 In Callahan, the evolv-
ing problem consistently outran the solution. As the, problem
grew, the resources pledged became unsatisfactory and the situa-
tion was compounded by a problem that was inadequately and
inappropriately defined. The providers actually came to resent
the claimants who were bombarded with political rhetoric about
their oppression.
An additional problem with reliance on consent decrees is that
resorting to the courts often results in political backlash against
claimants. As a result, the decree becomes a far less effective
means of affecting long term social reform for the proponents. The
consent decree also becomes the means by which professional pro-
ponents advance their own cause, often at the expense of the cause
of their clients. The attraction of a monitored settlement, with at-
tendant fees to the client attorneys, thus becomes more valuable
to the claimants than obtaining benefits through the political
process.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that consent decrees afford substantial and
important remedies. In various ways they offer genuine promise
for a higher quality of justice at a lower cost than the parties could
achieve through traditional adjudication. At the same time, their
extensive use distorts the role of courts in our society and excuses
local government officials from fulfilling the requirements of office.
In New York City, consent decrees have moved us one important
step away from democracy. We have become paralyzed and un-
able to sort out the rights of our citizens through the political
process.
53 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
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In the 1990's, it is clear that timid executive and legislative gov-
ernment is based on fear of fulfilling their responsibilities because
of unpopular political positions. 4 We are paying a substantial
price in the erosion of the public's faith in our government and its
leaders. An additional price we are paying may. well be the ero-
sion of public confidence in the judiciary. It leaves us with a mas-
sive problem, one with severe and important consequences for our
political system.
54 The current trend of many local and state governments to adopt term limits for legis-
lative members reflects the growing frustration with the direction in which our elected
representatives are moving.

